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Abstract We examine the relationship between different dimensions of the political
regime in place and human capital using a two-step structural equation model. In the first
step, we employ factor analysis on 16 human capital indicators to construct two new
human capital measures (basic and advanced human capital). In the second step, we
estimate the impact of our political variables on human capital, using a cross-sectional
structural model for some 100 countries. We conclude that democracy is positively related
to basic human capital, while regime instability has a negative link with basic human
capital. Governance has a positive relationship with advanced human capital, while gov-
ernment instability has a negative link with advanced human capital. Finally, we also find
an indirect positive effect of governance and democracy on both types of human capital
through their effect on income.
Keywords Human capital  Political regime  Latent variable  Structural equation model
Many studies have analyzed whether human capital is related to political institutions.
There is substantive evidence supporting Lipset’s (1959) hypothesis that high educational
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standards are one of the basic conditions for sustaining democracy (see, for example,
Castello-Climent 2008; Barro 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2005). However, the causal rela-
tionship may also run from political institutions to human capital (cf. Feng 2003; Ross
2006). The purpose of this paper is to examine whether political institutions affect the
accumulation of human capital. This is an important issue, as several studies conclude that
human capital is one of the main drivers of economic growth (see, for instance, Mankiw
et al. 1992).1
Our paper is not the first to analyze this issue. Previous studies include Baum and Lake
(2003), Lake and Baum (2001), Feng (2003) and Ross (2006) who all report a positive
significant impact of some proxy for democracy on various human capital indicators.
However, most studies analyzing the impact of political institutions on cross-country
differences in human capital have various shortcomings. First, there is a measurement
problem. Most studies employ school enrolment rates or average years of schooling as an
indicator of human capital, thereby implicitly assuming that human capital is a one-
dimensional concept.2 Similarly, studies employ political indicators often in a rather
arbitrary way. Second, authors generally do not examine how sensitive their results are
with respect to: (1) model specification, and (2) sample selection. This implies that a
particular variable may be significant in one model specification, but can become insig-
nificant in another model that may also be justified on theoretical grounds. Likewise, a
variable may be significant in a model estimated for a particular group of countries but may
become insignificant if a different sample is used.
To deal with these criticisms, we use a two-step structural equation model. In the first
step, we apply factor analysis to 16 human capital indicators for 123 countries to examine
whether human capital is multi-dimensional. It turns out that two factors capture most of
the variance of these indicators. Using this result, we construct two measures of human
capital (‘basic’ and ‘advanced’ human capital) to examine in the second step the impact of
various dimensions of the political regime in place on human capital in a structural model
with various economic and demographic control variables. We focus on different
dimensions of the political regime in place: the type of regime (i.e., the level of democ-
racy), the stability of the regime, and governance. We take a long list of potential control
variables into account that have been suggested by previous studies. Using the general-to-
specific approach (Campos et al. 2004), we decide on the specification of our structural
model. After testing for the sensitivity of our results with respect to sample selection, we
conclude that democracy is positively related to basic human capital, while regime
instability has a negative link with basic human capital. Governance has a positive rela-
tionship with advanced human capital, while government instability has a negative link
with advanced human capital. Finally, we also find an indirect positive link between
1 As Adams-Kane and Lim (2009) point out, there is a strong theoretical case that human capital can drive
growth in both neoclassical and endogenous growth models, although there is also the possibility of reverse
causality (Bils and Klenow 2000). Using panel data from 120 developing countries from 1975 to 2000,
Baldacci et al. (2008) explore the direct and indirect channels linking social spending, human capital, and
growth in a system of equations. These authors find that both education and health spending have a positive
and significant direct impact on the accumulation of education and health capital, and thus can lead to higher
economic growth. However, some papers do not report that human capital is significantly related to eco-
nomic growth (see, for instance, Pritchett 2001). Recently, Sunde and Vischer (2011) replicated earlier
results from the literature showing that both initial levels and changes in human capital have positive growth
effects. They also report that the effects are heterogeneous across countries with different levels of
development.
2 The same holds for most studies explaining cross-country growth differences. See Wo¨ßmann (2000) for a
critical discussion of human capital measures used in growth regressions.
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governance and democracy and both types of human capital through the impact of
democracy and governance on income.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, the literature on the rela-
tionship between human capital and political factors is reviewed. Second, factor analysis
and our results for human capital and political factors are explained. Third, the structural
equation model and our results are described. Fourth, the outcomes on the relationship
between human capital and political factors are presented, followed by a sensitivity
analysis. The last section offers our conclusions.
1 Political Factors and Human Capital
On the basis of previous studies, we identify three dimensions of the political regime in
place that may influence human capital: (1) the type of regime, (2) the stability of the
regime, and (3) governance of the regime.
The first political factor we distinguish is the type of regime in place. There are several
reasons why democratic societies may have better human capital then autocratic societies.
First, democracies will spend more on education since autocracies generally rely on the
rich, who care less about public spending on education than the poor or middle classes.
Brown and Hunter (2000, 2004) find a significant relation between human capital for-
mation measured by education spending and democracy in Latin America.3 Second, Feng
(2003) argues that an educated population may threaten authoritarian regimes. For
example, during the ‘‘cultural revolution’’ in China, schools were closed and graduates
were sent to the countryside. Finally, greater government attention will be paid to edu-
cation issues in democracies since failure to do so may result in politicians being removed
from office (Ross 2006). Baum and Lake (2003), Lake and Baum (2001) and Feng (2003)
report a positive and significant impact of democracy on various human capital indicators.
However, Helliwell (1994) finds that the significant positive relationship between school
enrolment and democracy becomes less strong and sometimes even insignificant when
initial GDP is taken into account.
The second political factor that we distinguish is the stability of the regime. It is likely
that individuals and governments are more willing to invest in human capital if the political
environment is stable and therefore more certain. The demand for education and Research
and Development (R&D) decreases in unstable periods as in such an environment it is
often difficult to make rational calculations on the returns on investing in human capital. At
the same time, political instability caused by, for example, riots, civil war or general strikes
(in particular of education personnel) can disrupt the educational system in a country.
Alternatively, individuals may prefer to concentrate their investments in human capital
during more unstable political situations since human capital is a less specific asset and
easier to transfer. However, most empirical evidence points in another direction. Katona
(1980), McMahon (1987), and Francis (2007) report a significant negative relationship
between human capital (proxied by enrollment rates) and internal conflict. Likewise,
Maloney (2002) argues that the endemic political instability in Latin America may have
been one of the major reasons why countries in the region have low levels of human
capital. Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998) distinguish between ‘‘regime-threatening’’ and
3 See also Pinto and Timmons (2005), Becker and Tomes (1979), Aghion and Bolton (1990), Castello-
Climent and Domenech (2008), and Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993).
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‘‘non-regime threatening’’ political instability and find that only the former is negatively
related to education levels.
The final political factor we distinguish is governance. The effectiveness of the gov-
ernment may play a role in explaining cross-country differences in human capital. For
example, for R&D it is important to have a well functioning judicial system to secure
patents. Likewise, endemic corruption and an inefficient bureaucracy may distort the
allocation of the education budget. According to the theoretical model of Veira and
Teixeira (2006), corruption causes lower levels of education due to a decrease in efficiency
in a corrupted country. Bhattacharyya (2009) reports a positive relationship between the
Rule of Law indicator of the International Country Risk Guide and the schooling data of
Barro and Lee (2001).
2 Factor Analysis: Method
As our aim is to estimate the impact of several political factors on human capital, we have
to quantify (or measure) these political factors. One of the difficulties involved in incor-
porating political variables into an econometric analysis is how to measure various types of
political events, systems, or concepts. While some political events are of a discrete nature
(e.g., coups d’e´tat) other concepts (e.g., democracy) are more difficult to quantify.
Studies that examine the effect of political factors, like democracy, usually choose their
political indicators in a rather arbitrary way. According to Munck and Verkuilen (2002,
5–6), ‘‘with a few notable exceptions, quantitative researchers have paid sparse attention to
the quality of the data on democracy that they analyze… To a large extent, problems of
causal inference have overshadowed the equally important problems of conceptualization
and measurement’’. Treier and Jackman (2008, 202) argue that ‘‘Some researchers even
operationalize democracy with a single indicator… However, the hope that a solitary
indicator circumvents these measurement issues is illusory; indeed, most scholars agree
that democracy is multifaceted, and hence not well characterized by a single indicator’’. No
doubt, the same applies to indicators of other dimensions of the political system. If authors
employ more than one indicator, they generally do not examine whether the indicators used
really capture the latent construct that they are supposed to represent. Furthermore, most
indicators of political institutions contain measurement errors. In other words, there is an
errors-in-variables problem, which causes biased estimation results (Treier and Jackman
2008; de Haan 2007; Dreher et al. 2007).
Likewise, studies that include human capital as a variable usually employ an arbitrarily
chosen (one-dimensional) indicator, like initial years of schooling or school enrolment
rates. However, it may be questioned whether these indicators represent all dimensions of
human capital. Woodhall (1987, p. 219) defines human capital as ‘‘the process by which
people—by means of education, training or other activities invest in themselves in hope of
raising their future income’’. This definition suggests that human capital is a multi-faceted
concept. Furthermore, also most indicators of human capital contain some measurement
error leading to a low quality data and biased estimation (Cohen and Soto 2007; Krueger
and Lindahl 2001).
To come up with better measures that include more information and to determine
whether human capital and political institutions have a multidimensional character, we
employ a so-called explorative factor analysis (EFA). The objective of an EFA is to
identify what different indicators of a latent variable (like human capital and political
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factors) have in common and to separate common factors from specific factors.4 Following
Wansbeek and Meijer (2000) and Lattin et al. (2003), the EFA model can be written as:
xi ¼ Dni þ ei ð1Þ
where xi is a vector containing the M indicators for observation i, i = 1,…, k (in our case
the indicators of human capital and the indicators of several dimensions of the political
regime), D is a vector of factor loadings of order M 9 k, and n is a vector of latent
variables with mean zero and positive define covariance. The random error term e is
assumed to be uncorrelated with the latent variables.5 Under these assumptions, the
covariance matrix of xi is:
N ¼ DUD0 þ X ð2Þ
where N is the parameterized covariance matrix that can be decomposed in the covariance
matrix of the factors U and the diagonal covariance matrix of error terms X. The model is
estimated with the maximum likelihood (ML) method. The log-likelihood function can be
written as:6
ln L ¼ ln Nj j þ tr½SN1 ð3Þ
where S represents the sample covariance matrix. Minimizing this fit function means
choosing the values for the unknown parameters that lead to the implied covariance matrix
that is as close as possible to the sample covariance matrix.
The next step is to decide on the number of factors to represent human capital or
political institutions on the basis of the scree plot, which plots the number of factors against
the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the indicators. In general, there are two ways of
interpreting the graph. According to Kaiser’s Rule, only factors with an eigenvalue
exceeding unity should be retained. An alternative way is to look for an ‘elbow’ in the
scree plot, i.e., the point after which the remaining factors decline in approximately a linear
fashion, and to retain only the factors above the elbow. Finally, information criteria, such
as the information criterion proposed by Bai and Ng (2002), can be used.
After deciding on the number of factors, it is possible that the factors of the (stan-
dardized) solution of the model are difficult to interpret. In that case, the factor loadings
can be rotated yielding a solution that may be easier to interpret because the matrix has a
simpler structure. Ideally, each indicator is correlated with as few factors as possible. The
rotation technique that we use to interpret the factors is the oblimin rotation, which allows
for correlation among the factors and minimizes the correlation of the columns of the
factor loadings matrix. As a result, a typical indicator will have high factor loadings on one
factor, while it has low loadings on the other factors.
4 The first step in this analysis is to check whether the data used is suitable for an EFA using the Kaiser–
Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy testing whether the partial correlation among variables is low.
A test statistic that is higher than 0.6 indicates that the data is suitable for an EFA (Kaiser 1970). An
alternative test is Bartlett’s test of sphericity, that checks whether the correlation matrix is an identity matrix
in which case the factor model is inappropriate. Both tests indicate that the human capital data and political
data used in the present paper are suitable for an EFA (Lattin et al. 2003).
5 E(e) = 0 and E(fe0) = 0.
6 We tested each specification for multivariate normality. In those cases where transformations have been
necessary in order for the data to satisfy the multivariate normality assumption, the non-transformed data
produced similar results.
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All indicators receive factor scores for the various dimensions (factors) identified. These
factor scores are used to come up with the so-called Bartlett predictor, i.e., the best linear
unbiased predictor of the factor scores:
n^i ¼ ðD0X1DÞ1D0X1xi ð4Þ
These factor scores can be used as a proxy for the latent variable.
3 Factor Analysis: Results
3.1 Political Factors
On the basis of the literature review of Sect. 2, we perform factor analysis on indicators of
the type of regime, the stability of the regime and governance.7 Table 8 in the ‘‘Appendix’’
shows the countries included in the analysis. We only include countries if at least 80% of
the required data is available. The number of countries included in the factor analysis
ranges between 169 for the stability of the regime to 140 for governance. For some
countries one or two indicators are not available for some country-years. We have less than
7% missing values. In order not to lose valuable information, we applied the EM algorithm
of Dempster et al. (1977) to compute the missing observations.8 Table 1 shows the indi-
cators, their sources, and the factor loadings for the three dimensions of the political regime
in place to which we apply explanatory factor analysis.9 We use averages over the period
1980–1999 to make sure that the political variables employed in the model explaining
cross-country differences in human capital (measured over the period 2000–2008) are
exogenous. The detailed results of the factor analysis are presented in an appendix that is
available on request (electronic supplementary material).
In the factor analysis on the type of regime (or democracy) we include indicators related
to electoral rules, democratic accountability, and political freedom. The results of the
factor analysis on democracy show that democracy is a highly significant (compared to a
saturated model) one-dimensional construct, which explains more than 60% of the
variance.
In the factor analysis on political instability, we include a number of indicators on the
number of elections, polarization within the government, regime changes, civil aggression
and protest. In line with the results of Jong-A-Pin (2009), we find four factors for political
instability. The first factor is highly correlated with guerrilla, revolutions, and internal
conflict and therefore we call this factor ‘‘aggression’’. The second factor is highly cor-
related with strikes, riots, and anti-governmental demonstrations and therefore we call this
factor ‘‘protest’’. The third factor is highly correlated with number of coupes, regime
durability, and constitutional changes and therefore we call this factor ‘‘regime instability’’.
The final factor is highly correlated with polarization and political cohesion and therefore
7 Various indicators of governance also include information on the decision-making process within gov-
ernment. As this dimension is captured by our regime measure, we do not include it here.
8 The EM algorithm is an iterative method, which involves forming a log-likelihood function for the latent
data as if they were observed and taking its expectation, while in the maximization step the resulting
expected log-likelihood is maximized.
9 Arguably, democracy and governance are closely related. The correlation between the two is about 0.6.
We performed a factor analysis on all indicators of governance and democracy. However, the results did not
make much sense. This is also the case if we perform a factor analysis on all political indicators.
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we call this factor ‘‘government instability’’. The correlation matrix of these four dimen-
sions of political instability indicates that each factor measures a different dimension of
political instability, because the correlations are very low. Together, these four factors
explain about 60% of the variance.
Finally, in the factor analysis on governance, we use indicators on government effec-
tiveness and regulation. The results of the factor analysis indicate that governance can be
represented by a significant one-factor model, which explains about 70% of the variance.10
3.2 Human Capital
To come up with a better measure for human capital that includes more information and to
determine whether the human capital has a multidimensional character, we apply EFA to
sixteen human capital indicators at the national level. The data used are averages over the
period 2000–2008. First, we consider three indicators of education levels. Most previous
studies on human capital used some indicator in this category to proxy the level of human
capital in a country (cf. Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; Mankiw et al. 1992). A problem with
these indicators is that they only account for formal education. We therefore include a
second group of four indicators of skills that may be obtained by formal and informal
education. As the concept of human capital is clearly much broader than education and
skills, we also include three indicators of labor market experience.11 The more and longer
people work, the more on the job training they arguably receive and hence the higher their
human capital will be. Finally, we include five indicators of science and technological
development. The more innovative a country is, the higher its human capital stock due to
study, on the job training, and experience.
For some of the 123 countries one or two indicators are not available for some country-
years. We have less than 4% missing values. In order not to lose valuable information, we
applied the EM algorithm of Dempster et al. (1977) to compute the missing observations.
The results of the factor analysis in Table 2 show that human capital can be represented
as a two-dimensional construct [detailed results are shown in an appendix that is available
on request (electronic supplementary material)]. The two-factors model can explain about
88% of the number of people in R&D, but less than 20% of the percentage of high
technological exports. In total about 70% of the variance is explained by the two factors,
while 30% of the total variance is unique, meaning that this part is unexplained. Since the
oblimin rotation minimizes the correlation between columns of the factor loadings matrix,
the general pattern that arises is that most indicators have a high loading on one factor.
In the first factor the secondary and tertiary education indicators as well as the number
of researchers, technicians, and scientific journal articles score high so we call this factor
‘advanced human capital’. In the second factor the primary education indicators scores
high as well as the literacy rate, so we call this factor ‘basic human capital’. Pearson’s rank
correlation coefficient between the two types of human capital is only 0.13 (although
significant at the 10% level), showing that the two factors measure two different dimen-
sions of human capital. Table 2 presents the indicators used, their sources, and loadings in
the two-factors model, while the complete factor analysis is shown in an appendix that is
available on request (electronic supplementary material).
10 See also Klomp and De Haan (2008).
11 Experience is calculated as follows [share of labour force with education level i] 9 [1 - unemployment
rate of education level i] 9 [average age of labour with education level i - years of education].
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4 Structural Model: Method
To estimate the relationship between political factors and human capital, we use structural
equation modeling. When the variables of interest are easily observable and can be
measured without an error, regression analysis will generally suffice for the analysis of
dependence. However, often the variables of interest are non-observable or latent (like
human capital and political factors). Therefore a structural equation model should be used
as a statistical technique to analyze the dimensions of a latent construct and analyze the
dependence structure (see Dreher et al. 2007; Jo¨reskog 2000). A structural equation model
is characterized by two basic components: (1) the measurement model, which allows using
several variables (or indicators) for a single latent independent or dependent variable and
(2) the structural model, which relates independent to dependent variables. The first part of
the model is related to factor analysis, while the second part of the model can be compared
to regression analysis. By combining these two analyses in one model, the measurement
error is reduced and the reliability is increased.12
Table 2 Human capital indicators
Source Factor 1 Factor 2
Education
Enrolment rate primary education Cohen and Soto (2007) 0.285** 0.594**
Enrolment rate secondary education Cohen and Soto (2007) 0.860** -0.409**
Enrolment rate tertiary education Cohen and Soto (2007) 0.894** -0.188*
Skills
Mathematics scores Altinok and Murseli (2007) 0.893** 0.234**
Sciences scores Altinok and Murseli (2007) 0.861** 0.274**
Reading scores Altinok and Murseli (2007) 0.892** 0.282**
Literacy rate World Bank (2009) 0.351** 0.703**
Labor market experience
Years experience with primary education Own calculationsa -0.053* 0.729**
Years experience with secondary education Own calculations 0.769** -0.231**
Years experience with tertiary education Own calculations 0.802** -0.143*
Average year of schooling Barro and Lee (2010) 0.913** -0.339**
Science and technology
High technological export as % of GDP World Bank (2009) 0.405** -0.015*
Number of researchers in R&D World Bank (2009) 0.888** 0.171**
Scientific and technical journal articles World Bank (2009) 0.851** 0.217**
Number of technicians in R&D World Bank (2009) 0.717** 0.133*
Number of patents per 1,000 people World Bank (2009) 0.480** 0.106*
** Significant at a 5% level, * significant at a 10% level
a Computed on the basis of data from the World Bank (2009), Cohen and Soto (2007), and Barro and Lee
(2001, 2010)
12 Using the factor scores as a regressor in a regression model would lead to inconsistent estimation results
because the latent variables are imperfectly measured. In particular, the coefficients of the latent variables
will be biased and inconsistent (Wansbeek and Meijer 2000; Bollen and Lennox 1991).
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The structural part of the structural equation model is comparable with regression
analysis and can be explained by a so-called path diagram. Figure 1 shows the path
diagram for our model. The unobservable g variables are enclosed in circles and the
observed variables are represented by rectangles. The error terms are represented by e.
The arrows leading from the observed variables to the latent variables indicate their
hypothesized direct effect on the latent variables. The arrows leading from g to the various
indicators represent the hypothesized impact of latent variables on the various indicators.
The strength of the effects of variables is indicated by k.
The vector control contains control variables that have been suggested in previous
studies. These include the level13 and distribution of income,14 fertility rate (Becker et al.
1990), life expectancy, general government spending, public education spending, invest-
ment, foreign direct investment (Noorbakhsh et al. 2001), net migration (Haque and Kim
1994), highest marginal tax rate, unemployment, openness of trade, total population, age
dependency rate, pupil–teacher ratio (Baum and Lake 2003), and rural population. Fur-
thermore we include three variables that control for the information channels available in a
country: number of people that have access to a newspaper, radio, or internet. Finally, we
include the share of females in the total population. Table 9 in the ‘‘Appendix’’ provides an
overview of all variables, their definition, as well as their sources. Like the political
variables, the control variables are measured as averages over the period 1980–1999
(except initial income that is taken in 1980). The arrow from and to the control indicates
Fig. 1 Path diagram structural equation model. Where basic human capital and advanced human capital
are our unobserved measures for human capital
13 Causality between income and human capital may run in both directions (Narayan and Smith 2004).
In Sect. 6 we will examine this in more detail.
14 Checchi (2000) reports a negative effect of income inequality on secondary education enrolment rates.
However, Castello-Climent and Domenech (2008) find an insignificant result for income inequality when
accounting for life expectancy.
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that the various control variables may correlate. We add also country group effects into the
model.15
5 Structural Model: Results
The structural equation model with all control variables but without the political variables
is taken as our starting point for the general to specific approach (see, for instance, Campos
et al. 2004).16 That is, we estimate a model including all control variables (except the
political variables). Next, we drop the least significant variable from the regression
specification and estimate the model again. We repeat this procedure until only significant
variables at a 10% level remain. We take the final result of the general to specific approach
as our baseline model that is shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.17 We allow for non-
linearities in the relation between income and human capital. The reason is that at a certain
level of development people tend not to invest anymore in ‘basic human capital’ but only
in ‘advanced human capital’.
The results indicate that the overall fit of the models is very good. The v2 statistic, which
compares the proposed model to an unrestricted alternative (saturated model), lies well
below the 5% critical value. The norm fit index (NFI) and comparative fit index (CFI)
range from zero to one, with values close to one indicating a better fit. The NFI has a value
of about 0.81, while the CFI has a value of about 0.82. According to these measures, the
model fits very well.
The level of income has a significant positive relationship with both types of human
capital. For basic human capital we find a non-linear relationship: when income increases
above about 8,000 US dollars (in prices of 2000), investment in basic human capital
decreases.
More income inequality increases basic human capital, while it decreases advanced
human capital. One explanation for this outcome is that when income is unequally distrib-
uted, a large share of the population is probably poor and does not have financial resources to
invest in advanced human capital. Since income inequality and the human capital indicator
are formulated as natural logs, we can interpret the estimated coefficients as elasticities.
When income inequality increases by 1%, basic human capital rises by 1.6%, while advanced
human capital declines by 1.4%. The fertility rate and life expectancy have a positive
significant effect on basic human capital, while public education spending has a positive
effect on both types of human capital. The impact of public spending on basic human capital
is about two times larger than that on advanced human capital. Finally, we find a significant
positive effect of the pupil–teacher ratio on basic human capital.
In the model shown in columns (3) and (4), our political regime indicator is added. The
results show that democracy has a significant positive relationship with basic human
capital, although the impact is quite small. If our findings represent a causal relationship, a
topic to which we will return later, an increase in democracy of 1%, implies that basic
human capital will increase by 0.21%. However, the relationship between democracy and
15 We identified the following country groups: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North and Central Asia,
South Asia, Middle East, North America, Central America and the Caribbean, Latin America, North and
Central Africa, Southern Africa, Australia and Oceania.
16 If we directly include our political variables into the general-to-specific method, our main findings do not
change. Results are available on request.
17 The model is estimated with AMOS 7.0 using the maximum likelihood estimation.
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advanced human capital is insignificant. So, our results only partially confirm the con-
clusion of Baum and Lake (2003), Lake and Baum (2001) and Feng (2003) who all found a
positive relationship between human capital and democracy.
Next, we add our governance measure (columns 5 and 6). This variable has no sig-
nificant relationship with basic human capital, but it has a significant relationship with
advanced human capital (the elasticity is 0.27). These results confirm the findings of
Ahrend (2002) who reports a significant negative relationship between corruption and
secondary enrolment rates.
Finally, we include the four dimensions of political instability to the baseline regression
(columns 7 and 8). Only regime instability has a significant relationship with basic human
capital, while government stability is significantly linked to advanced human capital.18
6 Discussion
6.1 Sample Selection
In the regressions shown in Table 3, we assumed that the political institutions have a
homogenous impact across countries. However, coefficients may differ across countries or
country groups due to heterogeneity. For instance, Brown (1999) argues that the impact of
democracy on enrollment washes out when countries develop. Therefore, we perform three
sample robustness checks. First, we re-estimate the regressions (3)–(6) of Table 3 with the
random sample method, replicating the regressions 1,000 times by estimating it with a
randomly changing sample of countries covering 40% of the sample. The first part of
Table 4 shows the random sample results. The results are in line with our previous find-
ings. We still find a direct positive link between democracy and basic human capital and a
negative one between regime instability and basic human capital, while government
instability and governance have a negative, respectively positive, relationship with
advanced human capital.
Second, we differentiate between developing and industrialized countries. The results
show that for the sample of developing countries democracy has a significant relationship
with human capital, but for industrialized countries the coefficient of our democracy indi-
cator is not significant. We also find that regime instability is significantly related to basic
human capital in developing countries, while government instability and governance only
have a significant relationship with advanced human capital in industrialized countries.
Finally, the number of countries included in the factor analysis on human capital and
political indicators differs from those included in the structural equation model. It is well
known that countries tend to produce fewer data on key variables when they are less
democratic. This implies that authoritarian states are likely to be underrepresented in cross-
national studies—which can lead to overestimating the benefits of democracy (Ross 2006).
To check whether our results are determined by a selection bias we perform two sensitivity
tests. First, we estimate the missing control variables using the EM logarithm suggested by
Dempster et al. (1977) to solve ML problems with missing data, and re-estimate the
structural equation model. Again, we find that democracy and regime instability are sig-
nificantly linked to basic human capital, while government instability and governance are
significantly related with advanced human capital. Secondly, we re-estimate the factor
18 We also included all six dimensions of the political system in one model. However, the results do not
change substantially. The results are available on request.
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analysis for human capital and political institutions including only the countries for which
we have all the control variables after which we re-estimate the structural equation model.
The results do not significantly differ from those reported in Table 3 (all results are
available upon request).
6.2 Indirect Effects
So far, we have examined the direct relationship between various dimensions of the political
regime in place and human capital. However, our political variables may also have an
indirect relationship with human capital, for example through their link with income. To test
this hypothesis we add a regression for income to our model. In this model, we replace
income in 1980 by average income between 1995 and 2000 in the regressions for human
capital and again used the general-to-specific approach to formulate our model. In the
regression for income, we use the secondary and primary school enrolment rates in the period
1980–1995 as regressors since most of the indicators used to construct our measures of
human capital are often not available for this period. We employ ‘lagged’ human capital
indicators in the regression for income in an attempt to avoid causality issues. Other variables
that turn out to be significant in the income regression are population growth, and investment.
The first column of Table 5 shows our baseline model. The results for human capital are
similar to the findings reported in Table 3. We find that secondary education, population
growth, and investments are significantly related to income. When we add democracy, we
do not only find a significant relationship between democracy and basic human capital, but
also one between democracy and the level of income (columns 4–6). So democracy is also
indirectly related to human capital. Similarly, governance is directly related to advanced
human capital but has also an indirect relationship via its link with income. However,
political instability has no indirect relationship with human capital via income.19
Table 4 Sample selection
Random sample Developing countries Industrialized countries
Basic Advanced Basic Advanced Basic Advanced
Democracy 0.215*
[1.81]
0.065
[0.87]
0.232**
[2.08]
0.071*
[1.71]
0.157
[1.14]
0.054
[0.46]
Instability: aggression 0.031
[0.13]
0.295
[3.56]**
0.042
[0.15]
0.395
[1.58]
0.026
[0.08]
0.260
[5.28]
Instability: protest -0.032
[-0.33]
-0.028
[-0.76]
-0.033
[-.50]
-0.040
[-0.90]
-0.026
[-0.31]
-0.021
[-0.88]
Instability: regime -0.010**
[-2.13]
-0.051
[-1.52]
-0.012**
[-2.45]
-0.053
[-1.58]
-0.009
[-0.07]
-0.049
[-1.43]
Instability: government -0.175
[-1.24]
-0.097**
[-2.33]
-0.177
[-1.30]
-0.104
[-1.21]
-0.151
[-1.55]
-0.075**
[-2.71]
Governance -0.011
[-0.13]
-0.178**
[-2.16]
-0.012
[-0.18]
-0.179
[-1.47]
-0.007
[-0.10]
-0.153**
[-3.22]
** Indicates significance at a 5% level, and * means significance at a 10% level. Estimated including the
control variables of Table 4; t values are shown in brackets
19 The effect of democracy and governance on income is higher in developing countries. The indirect
effects are confirmed by the outcomes of a bootstrapping analysis and rolling regressions. The results are
available upon request.
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Finally, we also test the indirect relationship between our political variables and
human capital through a possible link with income distribution, life expectancy, pupil–
teacher ratio, and public education expenditure. However, when the indirect effect of
income is included these other indirect effects are all insignificant. Also these results are
available upon request. The level of democracy may influence political stability (or vice
versa). Therefore we re-estimate the structural equation model including a relation
running from democracy to political instability. This relation turns out to be insignifi-
cant for all dimensions of political instability. Also the relation running from the
dimensions of political instability to democracy is not significant (results are available
upon request).
6.3 Method
Our results are based on structural equation modeling and in this respect our study differs
from all previous research that we are aware of. So as a minimum, our results can be
interpreted as an addition to the extant literature and a triangulation of the results reported
so far. An important advantage of our approach is that it allows employing multiple
indicators for each underlying latent construct such as human capital, democracy, gover-
nance and political instability. Furthermore, a structural equation model allows modeling
rather complex interrelationships among various variables. At the same time, a disad-
vantage is that the method is exploratory rather than confirmatory. So, in general, causality
is hard to establish. Of course, this is true for most cross-country studies. In an attempt to
deal with this problem, we measure human capital over the period 2000–2008, while our
political and control variables refer to the period 1980–1999. As it is highly unlikely that
human capital over the period 2000–2008 affects our political variables as measured over
1980–1999, we interpret our findings as causal.
To check how sensitive our results are to the methodology used, we also estimate a
cross-sectional regression model. Using the factor scores of human capital as our depen-
dent variable and the factor scores on the political factors as explanatory variables. The
estimated model is the following
HCli ¼ b0 þ bjXji þ h1POLITICALi þ di þ ei ð5Þ
where HCli is our measure for human capital of level l (advanced or basic) of country
i. The vector POLITICAL contains our political variables, i.e., our indicators of the regime
in place, governance and political instability found using the factor analysis. The vectors
X contain j control variables. We include the same control variables as reported in Table 5.
The variable di represents country group fixed effects, while ei is the error term. As our
dependent and main explanatory variables were obtained by estimation, we use bootstrap
estimation to obtain consistent standard errors in our panel regression.
The results in the first part of Table 6 show that although the estimated coefficients
differ from those reported in Table 3, which is probably caused by differences in opti-
mization, we still find that democracy has a positive relationship with basic human capital,
while regime instability has a negative relationship with basic human capital. Likewise,
government instability has a negative relationship with advanced human capital. Finally we
find that governance has a positive relation with advanced human capital.
As an additional robustness check, we also estimate a panel model. Gathering sufficient
human capital data for earlier years for our large sample of countries turned out to be
problematic. Therefore, the panel refers to the period 2000–2008. First, we perform factor
Political Regime and Human Capital 63
123
analyses on our human capital and political indicators using annual data. The estimated
model is:
HCli;t ¼ b0 þ bjXj;i;t1 þ h1POLITICALi;t1;...;t20 þ di þ dt þ ei ð6Þ
where HCli,t is our measure for human capital of level l (advanced or basic) of country i at
time t (t = 2000, 2001,…, 2008). The vector POLITICAL contains our political variables,
i.e., our indicators of the regime in place, governance and political instability. These
variables are measured as averages over the preceding 20 years. The vector X contains
j control variables. We include the same control variables as reported in Table 5. The
variables di and dt represent country group and time fixed effects, while et is the error term.
The results, as shown in the second part of Table 6, confirm the results from the first
part of Tables 3 and 6. We therefore conclude that our results are not driven by our choice
for structural equation modeling. As a further check on the sensitivity of our findings, we
re-estimate the panel model using political variables defined as averages over the pro-
ceeding 10 and 5 years, respectively. The qualitative results (available on request) are
similar to those reported in Table 6.
6.4 Reverse Causality
According to Castello-Climent (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2005), there exists also a
relation running from human capital to democracy. In this section we test for this relation.
We use the primary enrolment rate between 1960 and 1979 as an indicator of basic human
capital and tertiary education during this period as a proxy for advanced human capital, as
many other indicators that we used to construct our preferred measures of human capital
are not available for earlier years.
Our dependent political variables (democracy, political instability and governance) are
taken as an average of the period 1980–1999. The remaining control variables are based on
Castello-Climent (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) and include the level and distribution of
income, life expectancy, and total population. The results as shown in Table 7 indicate that
Table 6 Cross-section and panel estimates
Cross-section Panel
Basic Advanced Basic Advanced
Democracy 0.178**
[1.98]
0.051
[0.52]
0.120**
[2.02]
0.070
[0.76]
Governance 0.007
[0.52]
0.165**
[3.12]
0.026
[0.14]
0.219**
[2.88]
Instability: aggression -0.017
[-0.98]
-0.023
[-1.01]
-0.024
[-0.45]
-0.037
[-0.68]
Instability: protest -0.008
[-0.24]
-0.074
[-0.78]
-0.010
[-0.12]
-0.055
[-1.35]
Instability: regime -0.213**
[-1.97]
-0.078
[-1.32]
-0.151*
[-1.90]
-0.049
[-1.54]
Instability: within regime -0.029
[-0.34]
-0.198**
[-1.97]
-0.013
[-0.10]
-0.106**
[-2.03]
** Indicates significance at a 5% level, and * means significance at a 10% level. Estimated including the
control variables of Table 5. T statistics are shown in brackets
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the primary education enrolment rate is not a significant determinant of political institutions.
However, we find that the secondary education enrolment rate has a significant relationship
with the level of democracy and governance within a country. This result confirms the
conclusion of earlier studies by Castello-Climent (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2005).
7 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether political institutions affect the accumu-
lation of human capital. This is an important issue, as several studies conclude that human
capital is one of the main drivers of economic growth. Previous studies report a positive
significant impact of some proxy for democracy on various human capital indicators.
However, most studies analyzing the impact of political institutions on cross-country
differences in human capital have a measurement problem. Most studies employ school
enrolment rates or average years of schooling as an indicator of human capital, thereby
implicitly assuming that human capital is a one-dimensional concept. Likewise, political
indicators are frequently chosen in a rather arbitrary way.
To overcome these measurement problems, we examine the relationship between dif-
ferent dimensions of the political regime in place and human capital using a two-step
structural equation model. In the first step, we employ factor analysis on 16 human capital
indicators to construct new human capital measures. It turns out that a two-factor model
captures most of the variance of the various indicators. On the basis of this finding, we
constructed two variables: basic human capital and advanced human capital.
To construct measures of political institutions, we applied factor analysis on 3 sets of
political system indicators, i.e., the regime in place, political instability, and governance. It
turns out that democracy and governance can be represented by a one-dimensional con-
struct and that political instability is a four-dimensional construct.
In the second step, we analyse the impact of our political variables on human capital,
using a cross-sectional structural model for some 100 countries including various economic
and demographic control variables. We use the general-to-specific approach to decide on
the specification of our model. We conclude that democracy is positively related to basic
Table 7 Reverse causality
Democracy Aggression Protest Regime
instability
Government
instability
Governance
Income 0.318**
[1.99]
-0.307*
[-1.69]
-0.378*
[-1.88]
-0.313**
[-1.98]
-0.352**
[-2.00]
0.260**
[2.13]
Life expectancy ratio 0.176
[1.33]
-0.186
[-1.50]
-0.208
[-1.39]
-0.194
[-1.30]
-0.144
[-1.20]
0.149
[1.37]
Total population -0.197
[-1.32]
0.184
[1.26]
0.217
[1.15]
0.213
[1.48]
0.164
[1.25]
-0.194
[-1.26]
Income equality 0.618*
[1.78]
-0.545*
[-1.85]
-0.720**
[-2.04]
-0.597
[-1.62]
-0.503**
[-2.02]
0.668*
[1.66]
Secondary education
enrolment rate
0.165**
[2.01]
-0.138
[-1.52]
-0.187
[-1.46]
-0.184
[-1.29]
-0.177
[-1.25]
0.178**
[2.78]
Primary education
enrolment rate
0.089
[1.15]
-0.103
[-1.29]
-0.087
[-1.02]
-0.105
[-1.04]
-0.094
[-1.03]
0.086
[1.11]
** Indicates significance at a 5% level, and * means significance at a 10% level. T statistics are shown in
brackets
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human capital, while regime instability has a negative link with basic human capital.
Governance has a positive relationship with advanced human capital, while government
instability has a negative link with advanced human capital. Finally, we also find an
indirect positive effect of governance and democracy on both types of human capital
through their effect on income.
We also check whether our findings are robust for our preferred modeling approach by
also estimating cross-section and panel models. The results are in line with those of the
structural equation model.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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Appendix
See Tables 8 and 9.
Table 8 Countries included in the various factor analyses
Country Human capital Governance Democracy Political instability
1 Afghanistan d d d
2 Albania d d d
3 Algeria d d d
4 Angola d d d
5 Argentina d d d d
6 Armenia d d d
7 Australia d d d d
8 Austria d d d d
9 Azerbaijan d d d
10 Bahamas d d
11 Bahrain d d d d
12 Bangladesh d d d d
13 Barbados d d d d
14 Belarus d d d
15 Belgium d d d d
16 Belize d
17 Benin d d d
18 Bhutan d d
19 Bolivia d d d d
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina d d
21 Botswana d d d d
22 Brazil d d d d
23 Brunei d d d
24 Bulgaria d d d d
25 Burkina Faso d d d d
26 Burma d d d
27 Burundi d d
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Table 8 continued
Country Human capital Governance Democracy Political instability
28 Cambodia d d
29 Cameroon d d d d
30 Canada d d d d
31 Cape Verde d d
32 Central African Republic d d d
33 Chad d d
34 Chile d d d d
35 China d d d d
36 Colombia d d d d
37 Comoros d d
38 Congo (Brazzaville) d d d d
39 Congo (Kinshasa) d d d d
40 Costa Rica d d d d
41 Cote d’Ivoire d d d
42 Croatia d d d d
43 Cuba d d d
44 Cyprus d d d d
45 Czech Republic d d d d
46 Denmark d d d d
47 Djibouti d d
48 Dominica d
49 Dominican Republic d d d d
50 Ecuador d d d d
51 Egypt, Arab Rep. d d d d
52 El Salvador d d d d
53 Equatorial Guinea d d
54 Eritrea d d
55 Estonia d d d d
56 Ethiopia d d d
57 Fiji d d d
58 Finland d d d d
59 France d d d d
60 Gabon d d d
61 Gambia, The d d d d
62 Georgia d d
63 Germany d d d d
64 Ghana d d d d
65 Greece d d d d
66 Guatemala d d d d
67 Guinea d d d
68 Guinea-Bissau d d d
69 Guyana d d d d
70 Haiti d d d d
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Table 8 continued
Country Human capital Governance Democracy Political instability
71 Honduras d d d d
72 Hong Kong d d
73 Hungary d d d d
74 Iceland d d d d
75 India d d d d
76 Indonesia d d d d
77 Iran d d d d
78 Iraq d d d d
79 Ireland d d d d
80 Israel d d d d
81 Italy d d d d
82 Jamaica d d d d
83 Japan d d d d
84 Jordan d d d d
85 Kazakhstan d d d d
86 Kenya d d d d
87 Korea, South d d d d
88 Kuwait d d d d
89 Kyrgyzstan d d
90 Laos d d
91 Latvia d d d d
92 Lebanon d d
93 Lesotho d d d d
94 Liberia d d d
95 Libya d d d
96 Lithuania d d d d
97 Luxembourg d d d d
98 Macedonia d d d
99 Madagascar d d d d
100 Malawi d d d d
101 Malaysia d d d d
102 Mali d d d d
103 Malta d d d
104 Mauritania d d
105 Mauritius d d d
106 Mexico d d d d
107 Moldova d d d
108 Mongolia d d d
109 Morocco d d d
110 Mozambique d d d d
111 Namibia d d d d
112 Nepal d d d
113 The Netherlands d d d d
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Table 8 continued
Country Human capital Governance Democracy Political instability
114 New Zealand d d d d
115 Nicaragua d d d d
116 Niger d d d d
117 Nigeria d d d
118 North Korea d d d
119 Norway d d d d
120 Oman d d d
121 Pakistan d d d d
122 Panama d d d d
123 Papua New Guinea d d d d
124 Paraguay d d d d
125 Peru d d d d
126 Philippines d d d d
127 Poland d d d d
128 Portugal d d d d
129 Qatar d d d
130 Romania d d d d
131 Russia d d d d
132 Rwanda d d d
133 Saudi Arabia d d d
134 Senegal d d d d
135 Serbia and Montenegro d d d
136 Seychelles d
137 Sierra Leone d d d d
138 Singapore d d d d
139 Slovak Republic d d d d
140 Slovenia d d d d
141 Solomon Islands d d d
142 Somalia d
143 South Africa d d d d
144 Spain d d d d
145 Sri Lanka d d d d
146 Sudan d d d d
147 Suriname d d
148 Swaziland d d d
149 Sweden d d d d
150 Switzerland d d d d
151 Syria d d d d
152 Taiwan d d d
153 Tajikistan d d
154 Tanzania d d d
155 Thailand d d d d
156 Togo d d d d
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Table 8 continued
Country Human capital Governance Democracy Political instability
157 Trinidad and Tobago d d d d
158 Tunisia d d d d
159 Turkey d d d d
160 Turkmenistan d d
161 Uganda d d d d
162 Ukraine d d d
163 United Arab Emirates d d d
164 United Kingdom d d d d
165 United States d d d d
166 Uruguay d d d d
167 Uzbekistan d d
168 Venezuela d d d d
169 Vietnam d d d d
170 Yemen d d d
171 Zambia d d d d
172 Zimbabwe d d d d
Number of countries 123 140 161 169
Table 9 Data used in regressions
Variable Definition Source
Age dependency
ratio
The ratio of people younger than 15 or older than 64 to
those aged 15–64
World Bank (2009)
Females Share of females in the population World Bank (2009)
Fertility rate The number of children of a woman if she were to live to
the end of her childbearing years and bear children in
accordance with current age-specific fertility rates
World Bank (2009)
Foreign direct
investment
The net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting
management interest in an enterprise operating in an
economy other than that of the investor as a share of
GDP
World Bank (2009)
Government
spending
All government current expenditures, excluding
publication spending, for purchases of goods and
services as a share of GDP. Data are in constant 2,000
U.S. dollars
World Bank (2009)
Enrolment rate
secondary
education
Gross enrolment rate of secondary education Cohen and Soto (2007)
Enrolment rate
primary
education
Gross enrolment rate of primary education Cohen and Soto (2007)
Highest marginal
tax rate
The highest marginal tax rate as applied to the taxable
income of individuals
World Bank (2009)
70 J. Klomp, J. de Haan
123
References
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., & Yared, P. (2005). From education to democracy? American
Economic Review, 95, 44–49.
Adams-Kane, J., & Lim, J. J. (2009). Institutions, education, and economic performance. Paper presented at
the 2009 Silvaplana workshop on political economy.
Table 9 continued
Variable Definition Source
Income inequality Estimated household income inequality data set
(EHII)—is a global dataset, derived from the
econometric relationship between UTIP-UNIDO, other
conditioning variables, and the World Bank’s
Deininger and Squire data set
The University of Texas
Inequality Project (2006)
Initial income The sum of gross value added by all resident producers
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products on
1980. Data are in constant 2,000 U.S. dollars
World Bank (2009)
International
migration
People born in a country other than that in which they
live as % of population. It also includes refugees
World Bank (2009)
Internet per capita Number of internet connections per capita World Bank (2009)
Investment as %
GDP
Includes land improvements; plant, machinery, and
equipment purchases; and the construction of roads,
railways, and the like, including schools, offices,
hospitals, private residential dwellings, and
commercial and industrial buildings. Data as share of
GDP
World Bank (2009)
Life expectance The number of years a newborn infant would live if
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth
were to stay the same throughout its life
World Bank (2009)
Newspaper per
capita
Number of newspapers subscriptions per capita World Bank (2009)
Radios per capita Number of radios per capita World Bank (2009)
Population All residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—
except for refugees not permanently settled in the
country of asylum, who are generally considered part
of the population of their country of origin
World Bank (2009)
Public educational
spending
Current and capital public expenditure on education plus
subsidies to private education at the primary,
secondary, and tertiary levels
World Bank (2009)
Pupil–teacher ratio Primary school pupil–teacher ratio is the number of
pupils enrolled in primary school divided by the
number of primary school teachers (regardless of their
teaching assignment)
World Bank (2009)
Rural population Rural population is calculated as the difference between
the total population and the urban population
World Bank (2009)
Trade openness The sum of exports and imports of goods and services
measured as percentage of GDP
World Bank (2009)
Unemployment The share of the labor force that is without work but
available for and seeking employment
World Bank (2009)
Political Regime and Human Capital 71
123
Aghion, P., & Bolton, P. (1990). Government domestic debt and the risk of default: A political economic
model of strategic role of debt. In R. Dornbusch & M. Draghi (Eds.), Political debt management.
Theory and history (pp. 315–345). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ahrend, R. (2002). Press freedom, human capital and corruption. Delta working paper, 2002-11, Paris.
Altinok, N., & Murseli, H. (2007). International database on human capital quality. Economics Letters, 96,
237–244.
Bai, J., & Ng, S. (2002). Determining the number of factors in approximate factor models. Econometrica,
70, 191–221.
Baldacci, E., Clements, B., Gupta, S., & Cui, Q. (2008). Social spending, human capital, and growth in
developing countries. World Development, 36, 1317–1341.
Barro, R. (1999). Human capital and growth in cross country regressions. Swedish Economic Policy Review,
6, 237–277.
Barro, R., & Lee, J. (2001). International data on educational attainment, updates and implications. Oxford
Economic Papers, 53, 541–563.
Barro, R., & Lee, J. (2010). A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950–2010. NBER
working paper 15902.
Baum, M. A., & Lake, D. A. (2003). The political economy of growth, democracy and human capital.
American Journal of Political Science, 47, 333–347.
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., & Walsh, P. (2001). New tools in comparative political economy.
The database of political institutions. World Bank Economic Review, 15, 165–176.
Becker, G. S., Murphy, K. M., & Tamura, R. (1990). Human capital, fertility, and economic growth. Journal
of Political Economy, 98, 12–37.
Becker, G. S., & Tomes, N. (1979). An equilibrium theory of the distribution of income and intergenera-
tional mobility. Journal of Political Economy, 87, 1153–1189.
Benhabib, J., & Spiegel, M. (1994). The role of human capital in economic development evidence from
aggregate cross-country data. Journal of Monetary Economics, 34, 143–173.
Bhattacharyya, S. (2009). Unbundled institutions, human capital and growth. Journal of Comparative
Economics, 37, 106–120.
Bils, M., & Klenow, P. (2000). Does schooling cause growth? American Economic Review, 90, 1160–1183.
Bollen, K., & Lennox, R. (1991). Conventional wisdom on measurement: A structural equation perspective.
Psychological Bulletin, 110, 305–314.
Brown, D. (1999). Reading, writing, and regime type: Democracy impact on primary school enrollment.
Political Research Quarterly, 52, 681–707.
Brown, D., & Hunter, W. (2000). World Bank directives, domestic interests and politics of human capital
investment in Latin America. Comparative Political Studies, 37, 842–864.
Brown, D., & Hunter, W. (2004). Democracy and human capital formation. Comparative Political Studies,
33, 113–143.
Campos, J., Ericsson, N. R., & Hendry, D. F. (2004). General to specific modeling. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
Castello-Climent, A. (2008). On the distribution of education and democracy. Journal of Development
Economics, 87, 179–190.
Castello-Climent, A., & Domenech, R. (2008). Human capital inequality, life expectancy and economic
growth. The Economic Journal, 118, 653–677.
Checchi, D. (2000). Does educational achievement help to explain income inequality. Working paper
University of Milan 11.2000.
Cohen, D., & Soto, M. (2007). Growth and human capital: Good data, good results. Journal of Economic
Growth, 12, 51–76.
Databanks International. (2005). Cross-national time-series data archive. Binghamton, NY.
http://www.databanksinternational.com/32.html.
de Haan, J. (2007). Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered. Public Choice, 127, 281–292.
Dempster, A., Laird, N., & Rubin, D. (1977). Maximum likelihood from incomplete data via the EM
algorithm. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B, 39, 1–38.
Dreher, A., Kotsogiannis, C., & McCorriston, S. (2007). Corruption around the world: Evidence from a
structural model. Journal of Comparative Economics, 35, 443–466.
Fedderke, J., & Klitgaard, R. (1998). Economic growth and social indicators. An exploratory analysis.
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 46, 455–489.
Feng, Y. (2003). Democracy, governance, and economic performance. Theory and evidence. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Francis, A. (2007). The human capital peace, economic development, democracy and international conflict.
Working paper University of Chicago.
72 J. Klomp, J. de Haan
123
Gwartney, J., & Lawson, R. (2006). Economic freedom of the world. Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute.
Haque, N. U., & Kim, S. (1994). Human capital flight, impact of migration on income and growth. IMF
working paper 155.
Helliwell, J. F. (1994). Empirical linkages between democracy and economic growth. British Journal of
Political Science, 24, 225–248.
International Country Risk Guide. (2003). International Country Risk Guide. New York: PRS Group.
Jaggers, K., & Gurr, R. T. (2006). Polity IV, political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2006.
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Jong-A-Pin, R. (2009). On the measurement of political instability and its impact on economic growth.
European Journal of Political Economy, 25, 15–29.
Jo¨reskog, K. (2000). Latent variable scores and their uses. Downloadable from: http://www.ssicentral.
com/lisrel.
Kaiser, H. (1970). A second generation little jiffy. Pschychometrika, 35, 401–415.
Katona, G. (1980). How expectations are really formed. Challenge, 23, 32–35.
Klomp, J., & de Haan, J. (2008). Effects of governance on health: A cross-national analysis of 101 countries.
Kyklos, 61, 599–614.
Krueger, A., & Lindahl, M. (2001). Education for growth: Why and for whom? Journal of Economic
Literature, 39, 1101–1136.
Lake, D., & Baum, D. (2001). The Invisible hand of democracy: Political control and the provision of public
services. Comparative Political Studies, 34, 587–621.
Lattin, J., Carroll, D., & Green, P. (2003). Analyzing multivariate data. Pacific Grove, CA: Duxbury Press.
Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy.
American Political Science Review, 53, 69–105.
Maloney, W. (2002). Missed opportunities, innovation and resource-based growth in Latin America. Eco-
nomı´a, 3, 111–167.
Mankiw, G. N., Romer, D., & Weil, D. N. (1992). A contribution to the empirics of economic growth.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 407–437.
McMahon, W. (1987). Student labor market expectations. In G. Psacharopoulos (Ed.), Economics of edu-
cation, research and studies (pp. 182–186). Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Munck, G., & Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: Evaluating alternative
indices. Comparative Political Studies, 35, 5–34.
Narayan, P. K., & Smith, R. (2004). Temporal causality and the dynamics of exports, human capital and real
income in China. International Journal of Applied Economics, 1, 24–45.
Noorbakhsh, F., Paloni, A., & Youseff, A. (2001). Human capital and FDI inflows to developing countries.
New empirical evidence. World Development, 29, 1593–1610.
Pinto, P., & Timmons, J. (2005). The political determinants of economic performance, political competition
and the sources of growth. Comparative Political Studies, 38, 26–50.
Pritchett, L. (2001). Where has all the education gone? World Bank Economic Review, 15, 367–391.
Ross, M. (2006). Does democracy reduce infant mortality? American Journal of Political Science, 50,
860–874.
Saint-Paul, G., & Verdier, T. (1993). Education, democracy and growth. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 42, 406–407.
Sunde, U., & Vischer, T. (2011). Human capital and growth: Specification matters. IZA discussion paper
5991.
Treier, S., & Jackman, S. (2008). Democracy as a latent variable. American Journal of Political Science, 52,
201–217.
University of Texas. (2006). University of Texas inequality project. http://utip.gov.utexas.edu.
Veira, P. C., & Teixeira, A. C. (2006). Human capital and corruption: A microeconomic model of the bribes
market with democratic contestability. FEP working papers Faculdade de Economia do Porto No. 212,
Universidade do Porto.
Wansbeek, T. J., & Meijer, E. (2000). Measurement error and latent variables in econometrics. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Wo¨ßmann, L. (2000). Specifying human capital: A review, some extensions, and development effects. Kiel
working paper no. 1007.
Woodhall, M. (1987). Earnings and education. In G. Psacharopoulos (Ed.), Economics of education,
research and studies (pp. 209–217). New York: Pergamon Press.
World Bank. (2009). World Bank development indicators 2006. CD-Rom.
Political Regime and Human Capital 73
123
